3006A PRIORITY Intelligence Information Cable IN 553727 PAGE 1 OF q DIRECTORATE OF **OPERATIONS** FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE SECRET DIST 16 APRIL 1975 Political MATTERS COUNTRY: ARGENTINA SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TROTENTIAL TERRORIST THREAT TO SECRETARY KISSINGER IN ARGENTINA AS OF 16 APRIL 1975 SUMMARY. CAPABILITY TO ATTEMPT TO UNDERTAKE A KISSINGER DURING HIS SCHEDULED VISIT TO ARGENTINA. WHILE APR 22 1975 THE PEOPLEYS REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) AND THE MONTONEROS. BE EXPECTED TO TAKE SOME ACTION. INCLUDING CTS OT TERRORISM, IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT

(I) 115 gh *75

SECRET CENCE OUV

(classification) (dissem sonirols)

PAGE 2 OF 9 PAGES

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC
3024(i) (1) - Intelligence
Sources and Methods

~;

KISSINGER. THESE TWO GROUPS, EITHER INDEPENDENTLY OR IN
COOPERATION WITH CHER TERRORIST GROUPS, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY
TRY TO ORGANIZE LIGHTNING STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND WILL PROBABLY
ENGAGE IN BOMBING ATTACKS AND OTHER ACTS OF THIS NATURE IN AN
EFFORT TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE AND POSSIBLY
DISRUPT HIS VISIT, LEFTIST, NON-TERRORIST GROUPS IN ARGENTINA,
INCLUDING UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, MAY ALSO ATTEMPT TO PROTEST DR.
KISSINGER'S PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY WITH SMALL STREET DEMONSTRATIONS, PUBLICATION OF PAMPHLETS, WALL PAINTINGS, ETC. HOWEVER,
ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES ARE PREPARED TO USE WHATEVER MANPOWER
IS REQUIRED TO CONTROL THE STREETS AND THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO
KEEP STREET AGITATION TO A NUISANCE LEVEL. END SUMMARY.

1. TWO ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE JUDGED TO HAVE THE WEAPONRY, MANPOWER, TRAINING, DETERMINATION AND SUPPORT MECHANISMS TO CONSIDER UNDERTAKING A DIRECT, PHYSICAL ATTACK AGAINST U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER DURING HIS VISIT TO ARGENTINA FROM 23 TO 25 APRIL 1975. THESE ARE THE ERP. A MARXIST ORGANIZATION OF TROTSKYIST BACKGROUND, WHICH IS THE MILITARY ARM OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' PARTY (PRT2); AND THE MONTONEROS. MARXIST/SOCIALIST GROUP (LEFT-WING

(classification)

	WAI INTELLIGENCE	RNING NOT	FICE AND	METHODS	INVOLVED
JECKET					

(dissem controls)

PAGE 3 OF 9 PAGES

553727

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

PERONIST ORIENTATION.

2, THE MONTONEROS HAVE EFFECTIVELY DEMONSTRATED A HIGH CAPABILITY FOR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS INVOLVING ABDUCTIONS AND ASSASSINATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST WELL-PROTECTED THE ASSASSINATION OF FEDERAL POLICE CHIEF ALBERTO A R ON 1 NOVEMBER 1974 WAS AN EXAMPLE OF MONTONERO PROFICIENCY IN THIS REGARD. THE MONTONEROS ARE NOTED FOR THEIR PROFESSIONALISM IN PLANNING AND EXECUTING TERRORIST OPERATIONS. WHICH ALWAYS APPEAR TO BE BASED ON EXCELLENT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THE MONTONEROS HAVE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PENETRATED AT MOST LEVELS. PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THEIR PAST PERONIST AFFILIATION AND A PRESUMED HIGH NUMBER OF CURRENT SYMPATHIZERS WITHIN GOVERNMENT POSITIONS. WHILE THE MONTONEROS HAVE PLANNED AND CARRIED OUT HIGH RISK OPERATIONS IN THE PAST. IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THEY WILL UNDERTAKE AN OPERATION IF THE RISKS ARE JUDGED TO BE UNACCEPTABLE FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT. IN ADDITION, MILITARY

3 E O R E T

V/ARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED SECRET

PAGE 4 OF 9 PAGES

E025x1

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

Æ025x1

IN 553727

(classification)

OPERATIONS OF THE MONTONEROS ARE SUBORDINATE TO THEIR POLITICAL

OBJECTIVES.

3. THE MONTONEROS

CONSIDERED, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY REJECTED, AN ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE SECRETARY KISSINGER DURING HIS STAY IN ARGENTINA. REASONING FOR REJECTING THIS COURSE OF ACTION WAS THE BELIEF THAT IT WOULD TURN OUT TO BE POLITICALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR THE MONTONEROS, IF THIS WERE THE CASE, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE HIGH RISK INVOLVED IN SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WAS ALSO A FACTOR WHICH WAS CONSIDERED. ALLEGED THAT AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN THE MONTONEROS AND THE ERP TO DIVIDE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTESTING THE SCHEDULED VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND CHILEAN PRESIDENT AUGUSTO P I N O C H E T, WHO IS DUE TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA M A R T I N E Z DE

PERON IN BARILOCHE ON 18 APRIL. THE MONTONERS WERE SELECTED TO PROTEST THE KISSINGER VISIT,

WHILE THE ERP WAS GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY TO REPUDIATE PINOCHET'S ARRIVAL. THIS IS CREDIBLE FOR TWO REASONS: A) THE ERP HAS SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES RECENTLY THROUGH POLICE RAIDS AGAINST ITS ORGANIZATION IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE THESE RAIDS

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 5 OF 9 PAGES

SECRET

(classification)

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

UNCOVERED MEMBERSHIP LISTS, SAFE SITE AND MEETING LOCATIONS, AND OTHER MATERIAL CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO THE FUNCTIONING OF A CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION. THE RAIDS HAVE EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED THE SUPPORT MECHANISM OF THE ERP IN BUENOS AIRES AND HAVE GREATLY HINDERED THE CAPABILITY OF THE ERP TO MOUNT SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA FOR THE TIME BEING. 2) A CHILEAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, THE MOVE-MENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), IS PART OF THE ERP-SPONSORED REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATING COMMITTEE, A GROUP FORMED TO COORDINATE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTHERN CONE OF LATIN AMERICA. THE ERP WOULD PROBABLY BE VERY WILLING TO UNDERTAKE TERRORIST ACTION TO REPUDIATE PINOCHET'S VISIT AS A FRATERNAL GESTURE TO ITS CHILEAN TERRORIST ASSOCIATE, THE MIR. BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGED U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE OVERTHROW OF THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT IN CHILE IN 1973, THE ERP MIGHT FEEL OBLIGATED TO TAKE SOME ACTION TO PROTEST KISSINGER'S VISIT, EVEN IF AN AGREEMENT EXISTS TO GIVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS TO THE MONTONEROS. IN THIS EVENTUALITY, THE PRIZERP COULD BE EXPECTED TO USE ITS SEMI-LEGAL FRONT GROUPS IN BUENOS AIRES TO PARTICIPATE IN LIGHTNING STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND OTHER

		NING NO			
SENSITIVĘ	INTELLIGENCE	SOURCES	AND	METHODS	INVOLVE
SECRET-					

(dissem controls)

PAGE & OF 9 PAGES

553727

IN

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) Intelligence Sources and Methods

ACTS,

4. IF,

THE MONTONEROS HAVE REJECTED ANY

CONSIDERATION OF A DIRECT ATTACK AGAINST DR. KISSINGER, THEIR

FOCUS WOULD LIKELY BE DIRECTED TOWARD A TERRORIST INCIDENT

WHICH WOULD HAVE HIGH IMPACT AND WHICH COULD HAVE REVERBERA
TIONS AT A SUFFICIENT LEVEL TO DISRUPT OR DETRACT FROM THE

SUCCESS OF HIS VISIT.

THE

POSSIBILITY OF AN ABDUCTION/ASSASSINATION OPERATION AGAINST

A U.S. OFFICIAL IN BUENOS AIRES. SIMILAR TO THAT CARRIED OUT

BY THE MONTONEROS IN FEBRUARY 1975 AGAINST U.S. CONSULAR AGENT

SECRE

NW 54739 Docld:32986681 Page 6 --

FORM 3007 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

(dissem controls)

IN 553727

PAGE 7 OF 9 PAGES

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)

- Intelligence Sources and

JOHN PATRICK EGAN, THIS IS A THREAT WHICH CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED.

PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF RECENT MONTONERO TERRORIST HISTORY, BUT

THE MONTONEROS MAY ALSO REJECT THIS PATH, AGAIN FOR THE POSSIBLE

REASON THAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER IT TO BE POLITICALLY COUNTER:

ARGENTINA, OTHER POSSIBLE TERRORIST ALTERNATIVES FOR THE

MONTONEROS COULD INCLUDE BOMBING OR ROCKET ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S. EMBASSY BUILDING OR RESIDENCE. BOTH ACTIONS COULD GIVE THE

MONTONEROS THE PUBLICITY THEY SEEK AND WOULD HELP DETRACT FROM THE SUCCESS OF DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT WITHOUT THE RISKS

THAT OTHER, MORE INVOLVED OPERATIONS MIGHT ENTAIL.

PRODUCTIVE AT A TIME WHEN INTERNATIONAL FOCUS WILL BE ON

5. LEFTIST, NON-TERRORIST ARGENTINE GROUPS, INCLUDING
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA (PCA)
CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTEMPT TO PROTEST SECRETARY KISSINGER'S

VISIT WITH LIGHTNING STREET DEMONSTRATIONS, PUBLICATION OF ANTI-U.S., ANTI-KISSINGER PAMPHLETS, WALL PAINTING AND FIRE

BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. BUSINESSES IN BUENOS AIRES. SUCH ACTIONS COULD BE COORDINATED WITH THE MONTONEROS AND/OR THE

PRT/ERP FRONT GROUPS OR COULD BE CARRIED OUT INDEPENDENTLY.

THE ISSUES OF CHILE, INDOCHINA, CUBA AND THE U.S. TRADE BILL

(classification)

WARNING NOTICE

PAGES OF T PAGES

Methods

IN 553727

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) SECRET Intelligence Sources and

COULD BE USED AS OSTENSIBLE PRETEXTS FOR THE LEFTIST FORCES TO MOBILIZE YOUTH AND STUDENTS FOR THESE ANTI-U.S. PROTESTS.

ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES ARE PREPARED TO USE WHATEVER MANPOWER IS REQUIRED TO CONTROL THE STREETS OF BUENOS AIRES DURING THE VISIT BY THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES CAN KEEP STREET AGITATION DOWN TO A NUISANCE LEVEL. THE FEDERAL POLICE ARE EXPERIENCED IN PROVIDING PROTECTION TO VISITING DIGNITARIES AND LOCAL OFFICIALS, AND FEDERAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS HAVE VOICED CONFIDENCE IN THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO DR. KISSINGER DURING A BRIEF VISIT TO ARGENTINA. DR. KISSINGER'S MOVEMENTS IN ARGENTINA WILL BE FOLLOWED WITH MASSIVE POLICE FORCES. SINCE THE MAJOR TERRORIST GROUPS IN ARGENTINA ACT CLANDESTINELY AND ARE ARRESTED OR CAPTURED ON SIGHT, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY NOT UNDERTAKE WIDESPREAD PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF KNOWN LEFTISTS PRIOR TO 'DR. KISSINGER'S ARRIVAL.

ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES WILL PROBABLY INSIST UPON MINIMUM PUBLIC EXPOSURE FOR DR. KISSINGER DURING HIS STAY IN BECAUSE OF THE LATE HOUR OF HIS ARRIVAL IN BUENOS! ARGENTINA.

FORM 3007 USE PREVIOUS

(classification)

-		_
VARNING NOTICE CE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED	PAGE 9 OF 9 PAGES	_

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHOD

(dissem controls)

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1)
- Intelligence Sources and

553727

AIRES, IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT CROWD CONTROL WILL PRESENT MUCH OF A PROBLEM AT THE AIRPORT. IN VIEW OF THE EARLY HOUR OF HIS DEPARTURE ON 25 APRIL, AIRPORT CROWD CONTROL WILL AGAIN PRESENT MINIMAL DIFFICULTIES. IT IS EXPECTED THAT ONLY A FEW LOCAL PRESS REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE ON HAND FOR DR. KISSINGER'S ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE AT EZEIZA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THE MAJORITY OF THE PRESS WILL PROBABLY GREET DR. KISSINGER AT AEROPARQUE AIRPORT, WHERE DR. KISSINGER WILL BE TAKEN BY HELICOPTER OR PRESIDENTIAL PLANE FROM EZEIZA.

REPORT CLASS SECRET FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1) Intelligence Sources and Methods

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

ET 104

1975 MONTEVIDED , PROSELYTIZE AMONG THE KE CONTACT WITH ANY-LEFTIST GROUPS WHICH HAVE MANAGED TO RETAIN VESTIGES OF AN ORGANIZATION. THE

MLN IN MONTVIDED DOES NOT NEED TO MOUNT FUNDING OPERATIONS BECAUSE IT SUPPOSEDLY CAN GET WHATEVER MONEY IT NEEDS FROM ARGENTINA. END SUMMARY.

E025x1

(MLN-TUPAMAROS) IN ARGENTINA HAD LED TO THE FORMATION OF TWO RIVAL FACTIONS, ONE FACTION, THE PROLETARIANS, CONSISTS MAINLY OF YOUNGER MLN LEADERS WITH AN AFFINITY FOR THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP),

DISSENSION WITHIN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

SECOND FACTION, EO25x1 IS HEADED BY OLDER MLN LEADERS. PROLETARIAN FACTION HAD TAKEN OVER THE MLN. CENTRAL COMMITTEE.)

2. AS RIVALRY BETWEEN THE PROLETARIAN AND "PETIT BOURGEOIS" FACTIONS GREW, THE MLN DECIDED TO POSTPONE ITS "SO-CALLED" THIRD MLN CONVENTION WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN CUBA IN LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY. THE "PETIT BOURGEOIS" FACTION BEGAN CALLING ITSELF "THE MICRO ORGANIZATION." (THE MICRO). REMINISCENT OF A SPLINTER GROUP WHICH BROKE OFF FROM THE MLN IN THE LATE 1960'S. THE MICRO ACQUIRED CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH AMONG MLN MEMBERS IN SAN MARTIN, AN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX NEAR BUENOS AIRES. AND CONTROLLED THE COMMITTEE OF FAMILIES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, AN MLN FRONT GROUP, THE MICRO INCLUDED SEVERAL MLN LEADERS IN CUBA WITH CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE.

WARNING NOTICE ... 17 Martin (4.1) SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) Intelligence Sources and Methods 3. BY LATE JANUARY 1975, PROLETARIAN LEADERS HAD WON MOST OF THE SAN MARTIN MLN CONTINGENT AWAY FROM THE MIGRO. HOWEVER, DURING THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY, DISSENSION BETWEEN THE FACTIONS PERSISTED TO THE POINT OF THREATENED VIOLENCE. BOTH SIDES ISSUED DECLARATIONS OF THEIR POSITIONS, CAUSING THE PROLETARIAN FACTION LEADERS TO WORRY THAT RANK-AND-FILE TUPAMAROS WOULD BECOME CONFUSED AND DEMORALIZED. E025×1 4. WALTER GONZALEZ DIAZ, ALIASES. "TOMAS" AND "ABUSO", A PRINCIPAL PROLETARIAN LEADER, SAID THAT THE PROLETARIAN FACTION AND THE MICRO HAD HAD A RAPPROACHMENT AND HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE MICRO WOULD ANY LONGER BE A PROBLEM: THE RAPPROACHMENT WAS BASED ON THEIR COMMON GOAL OF SOMEHOW SECURING THE RELEASE FROM PRISON OF AN IMPORTANT MLN LEADER. THE MICRO TURNED THE COMMITTEE OF FAMILIES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, SOME 20 IMPORTANT CONTACTS IN EUROPE, SOME CADRE, AND MOST OF ITS FUNDS OVER TO THE MLN CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 5. DESPITE ITS QUARREL WITH THE MICRO, THE PROLETARIAN FACTION, WENT AHEAD WITH PLANS FOR: 1) INFIL-TRATING LEADERS BACK INTO URUGUAY FROM BUENOS AIRES, 2) BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN MONTEVIDEO, AND 3) PROSELYTIZING AMONG THE WORKING CLASS. ONE TACTIC UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS TO HAVE MLN MEMBERS BUY LAND IN A POOR DISTRICT AND BEGIN BUILDING A HOUSE ON IT. CUSTOMARILY IN SUCH CASES NEIGHBORS JOIN IN VOLUNTARILY TO HELP, AND THE MLN WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS TO MEET AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE AT LOWER ECONOMIC LEVELS. 6. THE MLN MILITARY CADRE CONTINUED DURING THE EARLY PART OF 1975 TO TRAIN IN ARGENTINA, CHIEFLY IN TUCUMAN. SOME MLN MEMBERS HAVE BEEN KILLED THERE, BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN ENOUGH TO WORRY THE PROLETARIAN FACTION UNDULY. ACCORDING TO GONZALEZ, CUBAN INSTRUCTORS ARE OFFERING COURSES IN ARGENTINA FOR THE MLN, THE ERP, THE ARGENTINE MONTONEROS, AND CHILEAN GUERRILLAS. GONZALEZ DESCRIBED THE COURSES AS

5 OFFERING A GOOD BASE IN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL TYPES.

and her the all the second of the telephone of the second of the second

ARE TRAINING LATIN AMERICAN GUERILLAS IN ARGENTINA.)

COMMENT: THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE THAT CUBAN NATIONALS

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO
BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION. FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(1) (1)
- Intelligence Sources and
E025x1 7.
THE MLN HAD RECEIVED AN OVERTURE FROM THE URUGUAYAN
COMMUNIST PARTY (PCU) ABOUT FORMING A JOINT
RESISTANCE FRONT, THE MLN WAS INITIALLY WILLING TO
DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE POUR THE MEN ALSO ALLEGEDLY
HAD CONTACT WITH ZELMAR H I C H E L I N I AND ENRIQUE
E R R O. LEFTIST URUGUAYAN EX-SENATORS IN EXILE IN
ARGENTINA, THE PROLETARIAN FACTION WAS INTERESTED IN
PINPOINTING AND MEETING WITH ANY LEFTIST GROUPS IN
URUGUAY, OF WHATEVER ORIENTATION, WHICH STILL RETAINED A
DEGREE OF ORGANIZATION.
8. GONZALEZ RETURNED FROM BUENOS
AIRES TO URUGUAY WHERE HE WAS PLANNING TO REMAIN
INDEFINITELY, WORKING TO REORGANIZE THE HOME-BASED MLN.
COMMENT: GONZALEZ IS A MUCH-WANTED MLN
FUGITIVE WHO ESCAPED ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1971 FROM PUNTA
CARRETAS PRISON IN MONTEVIDEO WITH 185 OTHER
TUPAMAROS, HE HAS A LONG HISTORY OF MLN ACTIVITIES.)
TWO OTHER PROLETARIAN MLN LEADERS WERE ALSO TO RETURN
TO URUGUAY FROM BUENOS AIRES. ONE OF THEM BEING ARY
TOUIROGA ALLAS PACO" AND TELACO."
COMMENJ:
OUTROGA WAS
CAPTURED WHILE TRYING TO ENTER URUGUAY AT
THE PORT OF FRAY BENTOS
THE MLN CONTINGENT IN URUGUAY OPPOSED THE RETURN OF
LEADERS OTHER THAN THESE THREE,
BECAUSE THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS STILL TOO FLIMSY 10
PROVIDE FOR MORE. HOWEVER, GONFALEF IS EXPECTING A - Intelligence Sources and
LEADER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS PARTY (PRT) TO
VISIT MONTEVIDEO AND ASSESS CONDITIONS IN THE LABOR
5 MOVEMENT FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. COMMENT:
4 3 USUALLY PRT HOULD MEAN THE ARGENTINE PRT, POLITICAL 3
ORGANIZATION OF HEICH THE ERP IS THE ARMED APPARAT.
SECRET. W 54739 Boold:32986681 Rage 18

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE_(NTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 5 OF 6, PAGES

٠. ا	BE IN	CLUDED	IN	ANY	OTHER	DOCUMENT	OR	PUB	LICATION.	FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(1)(1)	
			٠.							- Intelligence Sources and	-
3	E C 1	\ E T	•	2.						Methods	

HOWEVER, IN THIS CASE, IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT GONZALEZ IS

EXPECTING AN URUGUAYAN WHO BELONGS TO THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE.

THE MLN CREATED IN EARLY 1974 WHICH, AS OF MAY 1974, WAS

CALLED THE REVOLUTIONARY LENINIST PARTY (PRL).

THE MLN ORGANIZATIONAL SCHEME IS BELIEVED

TO STILL BE LARGELY THEORETICAL, AND MLN MEMBERS PROBABLY SWITCH
NAMES AND ACRONYMS AROUND FREQUENTLY.)

- 10. GONZALEZ ARRIVED USING FALSE ARGENTINE DOCUMENTS. HE FIRST STAYED IN A HOTEL ACQUIRED FOR HIM BY AN MLN. CONTACT IN MONTEVIDEO. THEN HE MOVED TO A PRIVATE HOME, WHERE HE WAS AWAIT-ING FALSE URUGUAYAN DOCUMENTS. GONZALEZ IS INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING A SAFE SITE, WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR A "PEOPLE'S PRISON" AND ANOTHER TO SET UP A CLANDESTINE PRINTING ESTABLISHMENT. THE MLN IN MONTEVIDEO HAS A MIMEOGRAPH MACHINE BUT IF NECESSARY, WILL BRING A PHOTOCOPIER FROM ARGENTINA. GONZALEZ HAS INSTRUCTED THE MONTEVIDEO MLN CONTINGENT NOT TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONS TO ACOUIRE FUNDS. HE SAID THE MLN HAS RICH CONTACTS IN ARGENTINA WHO CAN BE PERSUADED TO PROVIDE AS MUCH AS 300 MILLION PESOS ON SHORT NOTICE. COMMENT: IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER GONZALEZ MEANT URUGUAYAN OR ARGENTINE PESOS. IF URUGUAYAN PESOS, THE EQUIVALENT SUM WOULD BE U.S. \$124,500; IF OLD ARGENTINE PESOS, THE EQUIVALENT WOULD BE U.S. \$100,000.) ACCORDING TO GONZALEZ, THE MLN WOULD SPEND ANY AMOUNT OF MONEY TO GET AN IMPORTANT MLN LEADER OUT OF PRISON AND HAS WONDERED ABOUT BRIBING SOME KEY URU-GUAYAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.
- 11. SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL, GONZALEZ HAD A POTENTIALLY

 DANGEROUS CHANCE ENCOUNTER WITH A CHILDHOOD FRIEND WHO IS NOW

 SERVING IN THE URUGUAYAN NAVY. THE FRIEND ASSURED GONZALEZ HE

 WOULD NOT TURN HIM IN. HE INVITED GONZALEZ HOME FOR A MEAL AND

 WARNED HIM AGAINST ENTERING CERTAIN PARTS OF THE CITY WHICH ARE

 5 HEAVILY PATROLLED BY THE POLICE OR THE ARMY. THE EPISODE MADE

 4 GONZALEZ EVEN MORE SECURITY CONSCIOUS, HE WANTS ALL MEETINGS SITES

 2 RECONNOITERED CAREFULLY BEFOREHAND AND IS WARY OF APPROACHES FROM

 1 RECONNOITERED CAREFULLY BEFOREHAND AND IS WARY OF APPROACHES FROM

 2 1

E025x1

Intelligence Information Cable WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES Conserve St. (The promopouling content, example from General Declaration Rehadule of B.O., 11632 Examplion DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION. THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE CITE DIST 15 APRIL 1975 COUNTRY I ARGENTINA/CHILE E025×1 SUBJECT : XTERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND TRY TO FORCE THE CANCELLATION OF DR. KISSINGER1S
Intelligence Information Cable WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES Cetegory 35 (177) Ethymposalble to Determine Date of Automatic Declaration of This Information is not to BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION. THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE CITE DIST 15 APRIL 1975 CO UNTRY 1 ARGENTINA/CHILE BO25x1 SUBJECT 1 TERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES Coregony 58 (The promosphility of promosphility of Automatic Declarafication Echecule of E.O. 11632 Examption DIST INTELLIGENCE SECRET CITE DIST IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE CITE DIST IS APRIL 1975 COUNTRY I ARGENTINA/CHILE E025x1 SUBJECT I TERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS Cotegory 35 (Try pro) proposable to Determine Date of Automatic Declaratification. DE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION. THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE SECRET DIST 15 APRIL 1975 CO UNTRY 1 ARGENTINA/CHILE E025x1 SUBJECT 1 TERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION. THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE SECRET DIST 15 APRIL 1975 POLITICAL MATTERS - COUNTRY I ARGENTINA/CHILE E025x1 SUBJECT I TERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION. THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE SECRET DIST 15 APRIL 1475 POLITICAL MATTERS _ COUNTRY I ARGENTINA/CHILE BO25x1 SUBJECT : XTERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
SECRET OITE DIST 15 APRIL 1975 POLITICAL MATTERS - COUNTRY I ARGENTINA/CHILE BO25x1 SUBJECT I TERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
COUNTRY I ARGENTINA/CHILE SUBJECT I TERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
POLITICAL MATTERS _ 5-RTO COUNTRY ARGENTINA/CHILE BO25x1 SUBJECT XTERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
SUBJECT : XTERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
SUBJECT : XTERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
SUBJECT : XTERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
SUBJECT : XTERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND
TRY TO FORCE THE CANCELLATION OF DR. KISSINGER'S
READLES THYOLUTIONARY ARMY
TRIP TO ARGENTINA ERPLMONTONERO AGREEMENT TO PRO-
TEST THE VISIT OF DR. KISSINGER AND GENERAL PINOCHET
SUMMARY,
MONTONEROS, A MARXIST/SOCIALIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION OF
LEFT-WING PERONIST ORIENTATION, ARE PLANNING TO CARRY OUT ACTS 195
OF TERRORISM AND TO ORGANIZE OF HEAD DISTURBANCES TO PROTEST THE
VISIT OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER TO ARGENTINA. THE
MONTONEROS ARE ALSO CONSIDERING TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST U.S.
BUSINESS INTERESTS AND U.S. PERSONNEL AS A MEANS TO TRY TO FORCE THE
SECRET
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
5 G APR 25 1975
W-54739 DogId:32986681 Page 16

3007 6 0 APR 25 1975

FOIA(b)(3)) - 50 USC
3024(i)(1)) - Intelligence
Sources an	nd Methods
Take.	*****

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

ل ا

PAGE 2 OF & PAGES

(classification)

THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION.

E025x124 CANCELLATION OF DR. KISSINGER'S PROJECTED TRIP. A MEMBER OF A FORMER FACTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARM' (ERP), A MARXIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION OF TROTSKYIST BACKGROUND, CLAIMED THAT THE MONTONEROS AND THE ERP ARE COURDINATING THEIR TERRORIST OPERATIONS. ANOTHER MEMBER OF A FORMER ERP FACTION SAID AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN MADE TO HAVE THE MONTONEROS PROTEST DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT, WHILE THE ERP WAS GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO UNDERTAKE TERRORIST ACTION TO PROTEST THE SCHEDULED VISIT OF CHILEAN PRESIDENT AUGUSTONP I N O C H E T TO ARGENTINA ON 18 APRIL. THE "CHE" GUEVARA FACTION OF THE VARGENTINE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERATION (FAL-CHE), PLANNING, WITH OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS, TO STAGE A SERIES OF DEMON-STRATIONS TO REPUDIATE DR, KISSINGER'S PRESENCE IN ARGENTINA. SUCH PLANNING INCLUDED EFFORTS TO UNDERTAKE DIRECT ACTS AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL. END SUMMARY.

THE MONTONEROS ARE PLANNING TO CARRY OUT ACTS OF TERRORISM AND ORGANIZE OTHER DISTURBANCES TO PROTEST THE VISIT OF DR. HENRY

DocId: 32986681- Page 17

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

IN 552866

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 3 OF L PAGES

BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION.

THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO

(classification) (dissem controls)

/E025x1

CONSIDERING PLANS TO UNDERTAKE TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST U.S.
BUSINESS INTERESTS AND U.S. CITIZENS IN ARGENTINA PRIOR TO
THE ARRIVAL OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE IN AN ATTEMPT TO
FORCE THE CANCELLATION OF HIS VISIT.

E025x1

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ERP AND THE MONTONEROS ARE VERY CORDIAL E025x1

THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS HAVE SET UP A COORDINATING

COMMITTEE TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND TO

WORK OUT TARGET PRIORITIES AND ASSIGNMENTS. COMMENT:

5-F-C-R-F-T

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

IN ..552866..

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 4 OF L PAGES

THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO

E025×1

SECRET

BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION.
(dissem controls)

IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WAS FORMED BY HIGH-LEVEL MEMBERS OF BOTH ORGANIZATIONS.)

THE ERP AND THE MONTONEROS DEALING WITH JOINT PLANS TO PROTEST THE VISITS TO ARGENTINA OF DR.

KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT AUGUSTO PINOCHET OF CHILE.

THE MONTONEROS WERE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR

TERRORIST ACTION TO PROTEST THE SCHEDULED VISIT OF DR. KISSINGER.

WHILE THE ERP WAS TO HANDLE THE PROTESTS RELATING TO PINOCHET.

ORIGINALLY DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTEMPT TO ASSASS-

INATE KISSINGER, BUT THIS WAS DISCARDED AS BEING COUNTERPRODUC-

TIVE. THE MONTONEROS EVENTUALLY DECIDED UPON EFFORTS TO MAKE

DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA AS EMBARRASSING TO HIM AS:
POSSIBLE:

COMMENT: GENERAL PINOCHET IS

SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN ARGENTINA ON 18 APRIL. HE IS TO MEET

.

NW 54739 DocId:32986681 Page 19

E025x1

YORM 3007 FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods 552866 WARNING NOTICE PAGE 5 OF L PAGES SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO SECRET BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION. (classification) (diesem controls) WITH ARGENTINE PRESIDENT MARIA ESTEL AXMARTINEZDE PERON IN SOUTHERN ARGENTINA, AT THE TOURIST RESORT OF 34 CARLOS DE BARILOCHE. THE FAL-CHE, A MINOR MARXIST TERRORIST GROUP IN ARGENTINA. ACTIVELY PLANNING A SERIES OF MINOR DEMONSTRATIONS AND TERRORIST ACTS TO PROTEST THE ARRIVAL OF DR. KISSINGER TO ARGENTINA. THIS ACTION IS DESIGNED TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE AND POSSIBLY DISRUPT HIS VISIT. THE FAL-CHE WOULD BE WORKING WITH OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS IN ORGANIZING THE DEMONSTRATIONS. COMMENT: NO REFERENCE TO ANY CONTEMPLATED ACTS AGINST U.S. PERSONNEL IN ARGENTINA IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER.)

CMM 3007 FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods 552866 WARNING NOTICE PAGE L OF L PAGES SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO (classification (dissem controls) /E025x1 REPORT CLASS SECRET FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods EADVANCE COPY SENT ELECTRICALLY TO STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SWS NSA SS/ID FBI TREAS.3

	telligence Information C ble	© ROUTINE
DIRECTORATE OF	SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVE	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(1) (1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods
X41 [g Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11662 Exemption Categor	y 5B (T), (2). Impossible to Determine Date
SECRET	or the core	10 April 1975
COUNTRY ARGENT	199-	S-RTO Overstick 12-201
SUBJECT MILITA		POLITICAL/
	BUEDATA	
	·	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	F025x1
THE MONTONER	os, defined A Eologies, in which marxism is not the dom	S A COMPOSITE OF
AT THE LEADER	RSHIP LEVEL. THE MONTONE	ROS HAVE A STRONG
NATIONALIST,	CATHOLIC BACKGROUND AND THAT MODERATE SE	CTORS, I.E., NON-
	E AN INPUT INTO BOTH TACTICAL AND OVERALL REC.53 / 2-/ 2 ECHANISM OF COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP UNDER W	-201-0956
5 FUNCTION.	~ 104 . ∕E025x1	22 APR 15 1975

THE MONTONEROS FULLY

THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA WILL COLLAPSE OR WILL

NOT SETTE DOOTA 32986681 Page 2

. SECRET (When Filled In)

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

IN 547628

L.Y	10:
. 70	4 th 0

RECEIVED INTELLIGENCE DIV. PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES
FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC
3024(i)(1) - Intelligence
Sources and Methods

•	(classification). 00 + (dissem controls)
	BE OUSTED FROM POWER, UNLESS PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELAM ARTINEZDE
,	BE GOSTED FROM POWER, UNLESS PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELLAM A R T I N E Z DE
1	PERON UNDERTAKES A NUMBER OF PROFOUND POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS TO COORESPOND
	TO THE NEW REALITIES OF THE COUNTRY. THERE ARE ONLY
	TWO TRUE POWER FORCES IN THE COUNTRY AT PRESENTTHE ARMED FORCES AND THE
	ORTHODOX LABOR MOVEMENT. IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE, THE
	MONTONEROS BELIEVE THAT THE ARMED FORCES WILL BE FORCED TO MOVE AGAINST
	THE PRESIDENT. THE MONTONEROS ARE NOW TRYING TO UNITE THE ENTIRE SPECTRU
	OF THE POLITICAL LEFT IN THE COUNTRY, UTILIZING WHAT THEY CALL THE TACTIC
	OF ALLIANCE, IN AN ATTEMPT TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THE DEVELOPING
	POLITICAL CRISIS. THEY BELIEVE THAT IF THE MONTONEROS CAN BECOME THE
	SPOKESMEN FOR THE POLITICAL LEFT IN ARGENTINA, EXCLUDING OF COURSE THE
1	PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), THE PRESIDENT MAY HAVE TO TURN TO
,	THEM FOR SUPPORT AS A DEFENSIVE MEASURE AGAINST THE ARMED FORCES AND AS
	A MEANS TO SAVE HER GOVERNMENT. THE
	MONTONEROS ARE IN CONTACT WITH CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE PERONIST GOVERNMENT
	AND THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE WITH THE GOVERNMENT UNDER
	THESE CONDITIONS, PROVIDED OF COURSE THAT THEY COULD OBTAIN ADEQUATE
	POLITICAL BENEFITS.

THEY HAVE ABOUT 3,000 ARMED AND TRAINED COMBATANTS, HICH IS ROUGHLY THREE TIME THE ARMED STRENGTH OF

REGARDING THE MILLIARY CAPABILITY OF THE MONTONEROS.

SECRET

(dissem controls)

NW 54739 Docid: 32986681 Page 23

min Come

(classification)

(dissem controls)

J.NW-57753 Tookid 82986661 Page 24

Steket (When rilled in)

WARNING NOTICE

SENSUTIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

企业股外人企业的企业企业

IN 547628

	•	and the second s	PAGE 3 OF	4PAGES
• SECRET	(dissem controls)			
	E025x1			
THE ERP.	14.	MILITARY OPERA	ATIONS HAVE BE	EN RELEGATED TO
A SUPPORTI	NG ROLE VIS-A-VIS	POLITICAL OBJEC	CTIVES, I.E.,	ALL MILITARY
OPERATIONS	, INCLUDING ASSASS	INATIONS, ARE O	ONLY APPROVED	IF THEY CAN
ADVANCE TA	CTICAL OR STRATEGI	C POLITICAL OB	JECTIVES. FOR	EXAMPLE,
тн	AT THE ASSASSINATION	on of u.s. cons	SULAR AGENT JO	HN PATRICK
EGAN, F	OLLOWING HIS ABDUC	TION ON 26 FEBR	RUARY 1975, HA	D BEEN DESIGNED
FOR A SPEC	CIFIC POLITICAL OBJ	ECTIVE AND DID	NOT INDICATE	THAT THE . EOG
MONTONEROS	HAD BEGUN A CAMPA	IGN AGAINST U.	S. DIPLOMATS I	N ARGENTINA.
	EGAN HAD HAD T	HE MISFORTUNE	TO HAVE BEEN T	HE EASTEST TARGET
AMONG THOS	E CONSIDERED FOR T	HE OPERATION.	٠.	,
4.	COMMENT:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
\				
V				
5				
3				
2				,
· SECRET	•			

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

IN 547628

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1)
- Intelligence Sources and
Markada 'N

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

(diesem controls)

THE MONTONEROS ARE FOLLOWING A TWO-PRONGED, POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGY IN THEIR QUEST FOR THE ACQUISITION OF POWER IN

ARGENTINA. WHILE THEY MAY BELIEVE IN THE INEVITABILITY OF ARMED STRUGGLE,

THEY WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT A POLITICAL SOLUTION. IF SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY E025x1

WERE PRESENTED TO THEM. THE MONTONEROS WOULD HAVE

LITTLE QUALMS OVER POSSIBLE FUTURE TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST U.S. OFFICIALS

IN ARGENTINA, IF THEY BELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD OBTAIN A SUFFICIENT

POLITICAL OR TACTICAL OBJECTIVE THROUGH SUCH_ACTION.)